CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 185

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SOUTH ARABIA

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POSSIBLE ASSURANCE OF DEFENCE BY LAND BASED AIRCRAFT

AT SHARJAH OR MASTRAH

The Committee considered a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary

(OPD (67) 44) about the possibility of giving an assurance in respect of the defence of South Arabia after independence by land-based aircraft at Sharjah

or Masirah.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY recalled that it had been agreed that we should

renew our offer to provide a naval force off South Arabia for six months

after its independence, to maintain the confidence of the local government

by deterring military aggression from the Yenen and by bringing carrier-

based air power into action against it should such aggression nevertheless

occur. It had been decided that independence for South Arabia should be

in January 1968. We were at present seeking to persuade the Federal

Government to accept this timetable and to abandon their own much more

extensive counter proposals, to which the Government could not agree. The Minister without Portfolio (Lord Shackleton) after his discussions in South Arabia itself and the new High Comissioner (Sir Humphrey Trevelyan)

had urged that we should reinforce our offer by saying that we would be

prepared to use land-based bombers from Sharjah or Masirah in the event

of aggression occurring and to add that this offer would hold good beyond

the six months after independence to which we had limited the offer of the

naval forces. He believed that this would help to obtain the agreement

with the Federal Goverment to a date for independence in January 1968.

The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf had advised that there would be

unacceptable political repercussions there if the bombers were stationed at Sharjah, but that the Sultan of Muscat would very probably agree to their being stationed at Masirah. Only V bombers would have the necessary

range and they would be suitable only for attacks on airfields or ports and

not for the direct support of ground forces. Their role would therefore

be essentially a deterrent. Politically, such an offer would not only be

advantageous vis-a-vis the Federal Government, but its effect on King Feisal

of Saudi Arabia, on the Shah of Iran and on others in the area would be good

and the United States Administration would no doubt be relieved. There

would, however, be political disadvantages, including the fact that we would

appear to be moving further in substance from our earlier position that

there could be no defence treaty with South Arabia after independence. It was uncertain what attitude the Government of the United Arab Republic (UAR)

would adopt in respect of their forces in the Yemen after their recent

defeat by the Israelis. They might reduce their forces further or,

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